Trusted integration of cloud-based NFC transaction players by Pourghomi, P et al.
Trusted Integration of Cloud-based NFC Transaction Players 
 
 
Pardis Pourghomi  
School of Information System, 
Computing and Mathematics  
Brunel University 
London, UK 
pardis.pourghomi@brunel.ac.uk 
 
 
Muhammad Qasim Saeed 
Information Security Group (ISG) 
Royal Holloway University of London 
Egham, UK 
muhammad.saeed.2010@live.rhul.ac.uk 
Gheorghita Ghinea 
School of Information System, 
Computing and Mathematics  
Brunel University 
London, UK 
george.ghinea@brunel.ac.uk 
   
   
   
Abstract— Near Field Communication (NFC) is a short range 
wireless technology that provides contactless transmission of 
data between devices. With an NFC enabled device, users can 
exchange information from one device to another, make 
payments and use their NFC enabled device as their identity. 
As the main payment ecosystem players such as service 
providers and secure element issuers have crucial roles in a 
multi-application mobile environment similar to NFC, 
managing such an environment has become very challenging. 
One of the technologies that can be used to ensure secure NFC 
transaction is cloud computing which offers wide range of 
advantages compare to the use of a Secure Element (SE) as a 
single entity in an NFC enabled phone. This approach provides 
a comprehensive leadership of the cloud provider towards 
managing and controlling customer’s information where it 
allows the SE which is stored within an NFC phone to deal 
with authentication mechanisms rather than storing and 
managing sensitive transaction information. This paper 
discusses the NFC cloud Wallet model which has been 
proposed by us previously [1] and introduces a different 
insight that defines a new integrated framework based on a 
trusted relationship between the vendor and the Mobile 
Network Operator (MNO). We then carry out an analysis of 
such a relationship to investigate different possibilities that 
arise from this approach. 
 
Keywords- Near Field Communication; Security; Mobile 
transaction; GSM authentication. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
A Secure Element (SE) as a single entity that acts as a 
controlling party is unable to carry out remote operations 
within the NFC ecosystem. In other words, current card 
issuance models cannot support dynamic post issuance 
personalization process [2]. The remote operations include 
installation and loading of new applications in an external 
party, creation of security domains for an external party, 
activation and personalization of the applications that are 
loaded on the SE for an external party [3]; And this is 
because service providers:  
 
• Can only decide whether to use their applications 
or not and also have no control over the SE 
• Cannot control other applications that are stored on 
the same SE 
• May not have the permission to contact the SE or 
have the opportunity to get to know their customer 
personally 
 
At present, many restrictions and unknown constraints have 
created problems for the operations of Service Providers 
(SPs) and Secure Element Issuers (SEIs) in the mobile NFC 
world. Those restrictions have presented a new approach for 
business cooperation in which collaboration is essential 
between unknown parties, and none of the parties are able to 
influence the service environment substantially. Therefore, a 
technical solution and a clear framework are required in 
order to define constant procedures for ecosystem players.  
These constant procedures improve the interaction of 
business partners while it makes the negotiation and 
description of each interaction unnecessary. It also provides 
easy management and deployment of applications for 
unknown business partners. The Near Field Communication 
(NFC) ecosystem will not succeed without having such an 
approach which results in unacceptable business framework 
that does not provide satisfactory services for clients. 
Technical standards and fundamental interoperability at the 
basics are essential to be achieved for industries working 
with NFC technology in order to establish a positive 
cooperation in the service environment. 
 
Interoperability is also missing in the complex application 
level of the service environment which has resulted in the 
slow adoption of NFC technology within societies. Current 
service applications do not provide a unique solution for the 
ecosystem therefore the service environment does not meet 
the right conditions [3]. The current situation is that, many 
independent business players are making decisions based on 
their own benefits which may not be acceptable by other 
business players. 
A. Our Contribution 
 
Our goal is to provide a concept for an NFC ecosystem that 
is technically feasible, is accepted by all involved parties and 
thus provides a business case for each player in the 
ecosystem. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new 
cloud-based NFC framework that is an extension to our 
previously proposed NFC cloud wallet model (section IV) 
[1]. We then describe the transaction process which is based 
on the trusted relationship between the vendor and the 
Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and discuss a new 
scenario which can improve the trust in the mobile payment 
ecosystem. Furthermore, a general analysis of the scenario is 
carried out to investigate the potential limitations of this 
approach. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
gives a comprehensive overview of the SE lifecycle within 
NFC ecosystem. Section III discusses the role of cloud in 
NFC transactions and determines the benefits of cloud-
based NFC transaction approach. Section IV evaluates the 
previously proposed NFC cloud wallet model. Section V 
proposes a new approach to NFC cloud wallet model based 
on the trusted relationship between vendor and MNO. 
Section VI describes several scenarios based on our 
assumptions in order to analyse the new approach. The 
security analysis is then carried out to investigate the 
possibilities of weaknesses within our approach. Finally, 
Section VII presents the conclusion. 
 
II. II. SECURE ELEMENT (SE) 
 
Security of NFC technology is provided by a component 
called security controller. This component is in the form of 
an SE which is a tamper-resistant secure memory location, 
for example a smart card. SE acts as a platform within a 
mobile device or a cloud environment which specify a 
multi-application architecture and it consists of hardware, 
software, protocols and interfaces [4][5]. Regardless of SE’s 
location (either in a mobile device or a cloud environment), 
in the context of NFC transactions, it provides protection 
storage for transaction assets such as keys, transaction 
application code and transaction data. According to [6], 
Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) is the most 
flexible and reliable components to act as an SE within the 
NFC architecture. UICC is capable of running multiple 
applications which can be issued by multiple application 
issuers while it provides the same security as a smartcard. 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
networks are supported by UICC and it is compliant with all 
smartcard standards. The rest of this section describes the 
lifecycle of an SE which stands as a single and secure entity 
for storing client’s credentials as well as dealing with 
authentication mechanisms with the vendor’s Point-Of-Sale 
(POS) terminal. More specifically, details of SE 
management are described in [6]. In section III of this paper, 
we discuss the ways in which cloud computing changes the 
use of SE in NFC transactions by using the UICC as an 
authentication component. In this case, the cloud provides 
the main SE (virtual SE) which stores the client’s 
confidential transaction information and mobile phone’s SE 
which is in the form of UICC, is only used for 
authentication with the vendor’s terminal. 
A. Lifecycle  
 
The processes for application issuance and the way 
smartcards used to be managed by service providers are 
changed since the introduction of SEs. This is because the 
service providers are not forced to initialize and personalize 
smartcards before issuing it for NFC handsets. The rest of 
this section describes the lifecycle of an SE (without the 
cloud’s involvement) within an NFC phone [7].  
 
The Initialization of an SE can be completed by different 
SEIs such as credit card companies, MNO, financial 
institution or retailers. The SEI can also act as a platform 
provider. If the SE does not contain any applications when 
issued; that means there is no platform manager assigned to 
that SE. A platform manager cannot deal with the SE’s 
applications without having different certifications (i.e. Visa 
PayWave certification). These certifications are provided by 
the service provider. In most cases, the assignment of 
platform managers is dependent on the installation of the 
first application. Any party that installs the first application 
on the SE will be assigned as a first platform manager. 
However, the SE can also be managed by other application 
issuers. The SE can be issued by pre-installed applications 
that can be provided by the service provider which means 
the SE is already under the control of the service provider as 
its platform manager. 
 
The Activation process takes place when the SE is inserted 
into the phone. The SE then signs in to the NFC controller 
and NFC controller sends a confirmation message to the 
platform manager in order to inform the platform manager 
of the successful insertion of the SE in the phone. The 
platform manager then sends a confirmation message to the 
mobile phone in order to activate the SE. The platform 
manager is the only party that has the authority to hold SE 
keys for data configuration purposes. NFC controller 
identifier is also stored in the SE to inform the SE in case if 
it was inserted into another phone. 
 
During phase 1 of the Applications Upload process, the 
service provider (in this case also the application issuer) 
contacts the MNO which is the only party responsible for 
the Mobile Station International ISDN Number (MSISDN). 
The only way to classify the external party for an Over-The-
Air (OTA) transaction with the NFC phone is the MSISDN. 
In phase 2, MNO forwards the service provider’s request to 
the platform manager(s) which is in charge of the SE. If 
there is no SE in the phone, the MNO informs the service 
provider regarding this issue. In this case, application 
upload process terminates. But if the platform manager is 
positive with the request, it will send an offer directly to the 
service provider to upload its application. In the next phase, 
service provider selects one platform manager amongst 
others (if more than one platform manager exist) to load its 
data to the security domain area which is under the control 
of the same platform manager. The application data passes 
through a secure channel to reach the security domain for 
application personalization. If the handset is logged in to the 
network, the service provider has no problems in terms of 
alteration and deletion of data stored in the security domain. 
Having security domains ensures the privacy of each 
security domain in a way that different service providers 
will only have access to their own area within a specific 
security domain.  
 
The Deactivation procedures are also managed by the 
platform manager where it can deactivate the SE (OTA in 
the case of theft or loss). If SE is installed in a new device, 
then the activation process should be renewed and the 
platform manager is the only party that should confirm the 
activation process to enable the SE to be used for 
contactless transactions. 
 
The above description is dependent on the multi-host 
interface implementation that is not standardized yet. 
Accordingly, a control instance is required in order to 
control the SEs within the handset. Currently, there is only 
one control instance for the whole phone and not individual 
control instances for individual SEs. The control instance is 
responsible for establishing a direct communication between 
the NFC controller and the Subscriber Identity Module 
(SIM) through the Single Wire Protocol (SWP) [8]. It also 
deals with the communication between the NFC phone and 
the MNO and routes the communication. While an SE only 
act as a tamper-resistant data container, this communication 
channel is required to establish data channels and also to 
send short messages. 
 
III. CLOUD-BASED NFC SOLUTION 
 
Although using SE as a main secure component in an NFC 
mobile phone was a good start for the development of this 
technology, however once it got to the real stage of its 
global implementation, the ecosystem players faced many 
problems. We believe that bringing the cloud infrastructure 
into the NFC business will help to overcome many of the 
current problems. A cloud-based approach [9][10] offers 
several advantages over the use of an SE as a single secure 
component in terms of storing and managing sensitive data 
for an NFC transaction. However, according to the speed of 
the present generation mobile data services [11][12], it 
seems an NFC cloud-based approach needs another two to 
three years to become commercially feasible.  
 
The NFC cloud-based approach introduces a new method of 
storing, managing and accessing sensitive transaction data 
by storing data in the cloud (virtual SE) rather than the 
mobile phone. When a transaction is carried out, the 
required data is pulled out from a remote virtual SE which is 
stored within the cloud environment and pushed into the 
mobile phone’s SE in an encrypted format. The mobile 
phone’s SE provides temporary storage and authentication 
assets for the transaction to take place. After reaching the 
SE in an NFC phone, data are again pulled out from the 
handset and reach vendor’s terminal. In general, the 
communication between the cloud provider and the vendor 
terminal is established through the NFC phone. Fig. 1 
illustrates the overview of this approach [13]. In the rest of 
this section we describe number of fundamental advantages 
that this approach provides over the existing solutions: 
 
The storage capacity of the SE should be large enough to 
store user applications with unknown sizes. As the user may 
wish to add more applications to his NFC phone, this issue 
brings a limitation for existing solution because each SE 
supports certain storage capacity [14]. The other issue with 
the SE is that companies have to meet the requirements of 
organisations such as Europay, MasterCard and Visa (EMV) 
[15] to provide high level security in order to store cards 
data. 
 
This approach makes the SE expensive for the companies, 
while the cloud-based approach reduces this cost. In the 
NFC cloud-based approach, the phone’s SE can only be 
responsible for user/device authentication and not for 
storing data. This solution increases the cost efficiency 
compare to the current costs that SE makes for a company. 
Also, the NFC controller chips will be smaller and cheaper 
since they would not have to support all functionalities. 
Furthermore, the concept of the phone’s SE can be 
completely avoided by replacing it with the concept of a 
trusted zone that can be created within the processor of a 
mobile phone. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The vendor and the MNO communicate through the NFC Phone 
 
The NFC cloud-based approach also makes the business 
simpler for companies for the integration of SE card 
provisioning. It would be much easier for businesses to 
implement NFC services without having to perform card 
provisioning for every single SE. An NFC phone user will 
be able to access unlimited number of applications as they 
are stored within a cloud secure server and not in the 
phone’s SE. In terms of flexibility, all users would be able 
to access all their applications from their devices (e.g. 
phones, tablets or laptops) since the applications are stored 
in a cloud environment. Moreover, fraud detection would be 
instant as the system fully runs in an online mode. 
 
Since all the information is stored in a cloud (virtual SE), 
there is no need for mobile wallet. Therefore, in order to 
change their mobile wallet information, users can easily use 
the virtual SE to access the information they require online 
via a web browser. This approach also improves SP services 
as they are no longer required to develop different 
applications for different types of mobile phones. This 
approach reduces the risk of third parties getting 
unauthorised access while the phone is being shipped to a 
new user or for repairing purposes. This is because there is 
no SE with stored user confidential information in the NFC 
phone as this information is stored in a cloud environment 
and not in the handset itself.  The cloud-based transaction 
method provides the card present payment, since the 
phone’s SE deals with the authentication between the 
handset and the vendor’s terminal. This solution enables the 
NFC phone to be linked to multiple virtual SEs (stored in 
the cloud) that allows any user to access its own SE in order 
to modify the information (e.g. to add/delete applications). 
The acceptance of the NFC cloud-based transaction method 
is dependent on having the ability to implement strong 
authentication mechanisms as well as conducting 
transactions quickly enough in order to increase the 
performance. The processing times are far quicker in this 
approach because the virtual SE is stored in a cloud where 
there is more computing power available in contrast with 
phone’s SE. However, more time is required for data request 
to reach the cloud server and return back to the vendor 
terminal. Thus, the lack of connectivity can impede the use 
of the system. 
 
To summarise, NFC cloud-based solution offers infinite 
computing services and extensive capabilities in terms of 
storage, networking of shared devices and computing. The 
solution provides broad capabilities to enable the use of 
different platforms bringing the user access into ubiquitous 
computing. Different virtual and physical needs of clients 
makes the NFC a flexible technology therefore, the system 
should have the ability to provide a desired infrastructure in 
order to make the consumers capable of managing their 
resources in the best possible way. As mentioned 
previously, our aim is to discuss the use of NFC in mobile 
payments therefore we describe the previously proposed 
NFC cloud wallet in brief to introduce an alternative 
approach based on this model. 
 
IV. NFC CLOUD WALLET MODEL 
 
This model [1][13][14] introduced the idea of using cloud 
computing to manage NFC payment applications which 
result in flexible and secure management, personalization 
and ownership of the applications. This architecture 
provides easy management of multiple users and delivers 
personalized contents to each user. It supports intelligent 
profiling functions by managing customized information 
relevant to each user in certain environments which updates 
the service offers and user profiles dynamically. Depending 
on the MNO network reception, deployment of this service 
takes around one minute and deployments can be scaled to 
any number of users.  
 
The idea of this approach is that every time the customer 
makes a purchase the payment application that contains 
customer credentials is downloaded into the phone’s SE 
from the cloud and, after the transaction, it is deleted from 
the device and the cloud will be updated to keep a correct 
record of customer account balance. The execution of the 
model is described as follows: 
 
1) Customer scans the NFC enabled phone on the vendor’s 
terminal to make the payment 
2) The payment application is downloaded into customer’s 
mobile phone SE 
3) The reader communicates with the cloud provider to 
check whether the customer has enough credit  
4) Cloud provider transfers the required information to the 
reader 
5) Based on the information that was transferred to the 
reader, the reader either authorizes the transaction or rejects 
customer’s request 
6) Reader communicates with the cloud to update customer 
balance if customer request was authorized, the amount of 
purchase will be withdrawn from his account otherwise 
customer account remains with the same balance 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates the steps that should be undertaken to 
complete the transaction process. As an addition to this 
model, we suggest: when NFC enabled phone sends a 
request to its cloud provider to get permission to make a 
payment (step 1), cloud provider sends an Short Message 
Service (SMS) requesting a Personal Identification Number 
(PIN) number to identify the user of the phone. This is how 
cloud provider ensures the legitimacy of the phone user. For 
the purpose of verification, the customer sends PIN back to 
the cloud provider as an SMS. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. NFC Cloud Wallet 
 
V. PROPOSED MODEL 
 
We propose an extension to previously proposed NFC 
Cloud Wallet model. Since there are multiple options 
applicable to this model, we designed our model based on 
the following assumptions: 
 
• The virtual SE is part of the cloud which is 
managed by the MNO 
• The phone’s SE is only used for authentication 
purposes. SIM as SE is the best approach in this 
scenario (i.e. UICC) 
• The MNO manages the SE/SIM 
• Banks, etc. have connections with MNO 
• The vendor trusts the MNO 
 
The virtual SE securely stores personal data such as debit 
and credit card information, user identification number, 
loyalty program data, payment applications, PINs and 
networking contacts, among other information. However, 
the phone’s SE consists of authentication data such as keys, 
certificates, protocols and cryptographic mechanisms. As 
explained in section II, SE is in the form of UICC in our 
model (SE part of the SIM) therefore, the SIM only deals 
with the authentication of handset to MNO and handset to 
vendor terminal. Rather than that, the main transaction data 
are stored in the SE within the cloud environment. During 
the whole process, MNO manages the cloud environment 
and it is the only party that has full access and permission to 
manage confidential data which are stored in the cloud. As 
MNO is the owner of the cloud, it fully manages the SIM in 
terms of monitoring the GSM network and controlling 
cloud’s data. The key assumption of this framework which 
makes the whole process logical in terms of its protocol 
design is the trusted relationship between the vendor and 
MNO. The analysis of this assumption is described in 
section VI. Below is the step by step description of the 
process as illustrated in Fig.3. 
 
1) Customer selects a product. Purchase request sent to the 
vendor’s terminal 
2) Vendor’s terminal displays the price 
3) If Customer agrees with the price, he places his 
NFC enabled phone on the vending machine 
4) NFC link is established between the vendor terminal and 
the NFC enabled phone 
5) The customer requests a message from the MNO to use it 
in order to prove its legitimacy to the vendor. Customer also 
informs MNO of the total price. 
6) The MNO first authenticates the customer. After a 
successful authentication, if the MNO agrees with the price, 
it sends a digitally signed confirmation message to NFC 
enabled phone (the customer) 
7) The mobile device then relays the same message to the 
vendor terminal 
• Since vendor terminal trusts MNO, it trusts the 
digitally signed message 
 
 
 
Figure 3. MNO communicates with vendor through NFC phone 
 
 
8) The NFC enabled phone displays enter PIN to verify its 
legitimacy and its ownership of the cellphone (additional 
security mechanism) 
9) Vendor terminal sends its banking details in an encrypted 
form to the NFC enabled phone. This message can be 
decrypted only by the MNO.  
10) NFC enabled phone transfers the same banking details 
to the MNO 
11) The MNO performs the transaction 
12) The MNO sends a signed receipt to the vendor terminal 
through the NFC enabled phone 
13) The vendor’s terminal verifies the receipt 
14) If the verification is successful, the product is delivered 
and a success message displays on the NFC enabled phone 
 
The trusted relationship between the vendor and MNO 
establishes when the MNO sends a confirmation message of 
the vendor through the NFC enabled phone (steps 6and 7). 
This digitally signed message confirms that the customer 
has enough credit for the transaction. 
 
VI. ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we carry out an analysis from security point 
of view. Since this protocol is used for monitory 
transactions, it must be as much secure as possible. We 
sketched multiple scenarios where a buyer or a seller is 
dishonest and then analysed their success probability. 
 
In the first scenario, we assume that a customer is dishonest 
and wants to purchase a product without payment. The 
dishonest customer can only be successful if he can 
successfully generate a signed receipt in step 12 of the 
protocol. Since this receipt is signed by the MNO, an 
illegitimate customer cannot generate a valid receipt. 
Moreover, the dishonest customer cannot replay the old 
receipt as the receipt contains time information. Therefore, 
this scenario is not successful. 
 
In another scenario, we assume that the customer is 
dishonest and just want to extract the banking details of a 
vendor. The vendor provides his banking details after it 
receives a signed confirmation from the MNO. The banking 
details are encrypted so the customer cannot decrypt and 
understand this message. This message can be decrypted by 
the MNO only who needs banking details for the 
transaction. So a dishonest customer is again unsuccessful. 
 
In the third scenario, the seller is dishonest and plans to 
extract more than the required amount from a customer. To 
perform this action, the seller alters the price information at 
transaction stage. However, the alteration is deducted in the 
signed receipt provided by the MNO after transaction. This 
receipt is provided to both, the customer and the seller. The 
customer detects any alteration in the price by the seller. So 
this scenario is also not successful. 
 
In the fourth scenario, the seller is dishonest and records all 
the legitimate messages of a customer. He plans to replay 
the recorded messages to the MNO to extract money from a 
customer in his absence. To do this, the dishonest seller 
impersonates as a customer to MNO. This impersonation is 
detected by the MNO in the initial steps of the model where 
the MNO authenticates a customer before proceeding to 
transaction. This scenario is, again, not successful. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we discussed the NFC cloud wallet model and 
introduced a different insight which proposed a new 
integrated framework based on trusted integrations of cloud-
based NFC transaction players which are the MNO, the 
NFC phone user and the vendor. We considered a cloud-
based approach for managing sensitive data to ensure the 
security of NFC transactions over the use of a virtual SE as 
well as considering the role of mobile phone’s SE within the 
NFC payment architecture. In addition, this paper provides 
related issues that are essential to investigate other possible 
ecosystem architectures, players with their roles, different 
possible access controls and ownership issues in NFC 
ecosystem. Although this paper suggests a new payment 
method, but we do not recommend it for large transactions 
(over £50.00) to avoid security limitations imposed by 
technology providers. In return, for the convenience, it 
offers customers in terms of a faster and more streamlined 
purchasing process. As a part of future research, issues such 
as the connectivity between the cloud and the NFC phone, 
the cloud’s architecture while operating as a service 
provider (MNO in our scenario), a framework for 
application personalization procedures, and the design of 
security payment protocols can be explored, designed and 
analysed in order to finalize the most reliable architecture 
for cloud-based NFC transactions. 
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